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Introduction 
The international community is devoting increasing attention to social security issues in 
developing countries as part of its preoccupation with poverty reduction (ILO 2000). 
This paper will discuss various social security arrangements in place in sub-Saharan 
African countries to mitigate the contingencies of their citizens, with emphasis on the 
masses of poor people, including the ways in which the poor themselves try to tackle 
unexpected adversity.1 My basic argument is that for a social security system to be 
feasible in the current circumstances of widespread economic crisis, formal and 
informal mechanisms will have to be combined. 
Vulnerability 
The African poor pursue a series of strategies on a daily basis to supplement their low 
incomes, to meet rising consumer prices, and to cope with inadequate or unreliable 
economic and social infrastructure. Elsewhere, I have devoted considerable space to 
discussing how poor households, in effect, become translocational in their efforts to 
pool income from multiple sources, of which oscillatory labour migration is but one 
(Tostensen 2003). 
 
Being poor, however, means more than daily struggle to eke out a living. A defining 
aspect of poverty is vulnerability to shocks and contingencies. Vulnerability means 
defencelessness, insecurity and exposure to risk, shocks and stress. It is a reflection not 
only of low incomes but also of limited assets, such as human investments in health 
and education, productive assets including housing and domestic equipment, access to 
community infrastructure, stores of social capital and claims on other households and 
patrons. It may also stem from the lack of access to the government and to the 
international community for resources in times of need (Wratten 1995:17). 
 
The shocks that threaten the well-being of individuals, households or communities take 
many forms. They include natural and ecological calamities (droughts, floods, 
earthquakes, epidemics, pests, etc.) or human-made disasters of economic, social or 
political nature (e.g. wars and civil strife). Perhaps more difficult to redress than 
sudden dramatic shocks are the gradual long-term adverse trends or seasonal cycles 
that often produce crises, although the drama may be less evident.  
 
To withstand economic shocks or economic crises, households must be able to survive 
such periods without irreversible damage to the productive capacity of their members 
and to their net asset position. The greater the risk and uncertainty, the more 
households are inclined to diversify their assets to prevent such erosion. When asset 
bases become so depleted that even an upturn in the economy cannot reverse the 
damage – when all ‘capital is cashed in’ – households are extremely vulnerable (Moser 
1996:24). 
 
Poor people who live at the margin are particularly sensitive to unexpected events and 
are less capable of coping with their consequences. In other words, vulnerability is not 
                                                 
1 This paper is a slightly revised version of the trial lecture over a topic of my own choice for the Dr. Philos. 
degree, held on 30 May 2003 at the University of Bergen. 
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only related to coping with the sudden and temporary loss of income, but equally much 
to the wherewithal to recover after the shocks and to restore livelihoods at least to the 
pre-shock level. The ability to recover or not could mean the difference between 
survival and continued livelihood at a very meagre level, on the one hand, and 
spiralling indebtedness, eventually resulting in destitution and social exclusion, on the 
other. The imperative of post-shock recovery is a major reason why social security – 
even in rudimentary form – takes on particular importance for the poor. 
The normative foundation 
A social Darwinist perspective would consider social security an entirely superfluous 
institution: the economy functions the way it does, and if any of the players in the 
marketplace become casualties, so be it; nobody else has a responsibility to bail them 
out, except perhaps their immediate families and whatever faith-based organisations 
that might be around to provide charity. Whereas such a view may have had some 
currency two-three centuries ago, it is not acceptable today. Since the end of the 19th 
century the normative basis of social security has been carried forward and buttressed 
by social and political movements and gradually taken hold as part of a general social 
ethos, especially in the early parts of the 20th century (Ghai 2003:128–130). 
 
After the end of World War II the right to social security was enshrined in Article 22 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ILO Convention no. 102 of 1952 is far 
more detailed and specifies a series of minimum standards that social security is 
expected to satisfy. These rights were subsequently reconfirmed in Article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from 1966 which 
recognises “the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.” Thus, 
the normative foundation of social security is not in question, neither in society at large 
nor in international law. 
 
The actual implementation, however, of these obligations on the part of the signatories 
to the conventions varies widely across the globe. In most industrialised countries 
elaborate welfare states have been established which afford the citizens generous social 
protection – some would say too generous. The Nordic states are often seen as models 
to be emulated in that regard and represent one extreme of the spectrum of legal 
systems and practises. The situation in most developing countries is a far cry from the 
Nordic case. The predicament of sub-Saharan Africa is particularly egregious – perhaps 
with the exception of South Africa (Olivier et al. 2001). In its General Comment no. 6 
(para. 30) the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises, 
however, that the full implementation of Article 9 can only be done “within the limits 
of available resources” but it does not specify what they are. This is an example of 
what is often referred to as an aspirational or hortatory right, of which there are many. 
In fact, most of the articles contained in the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights are of that nature. With regard to the ‘rubber-like’ quality of these 
rights the qualifying formulation of Article 2 is telling. It refers not only to availability 
of resources but also to the “progressive realisation” of rights. In other words, the 
Covenant concedes that the obligations of the signatories are not expected to be 
fulfilled immediately; the process seems open-ended. Although the primary 
responsibility for social security provision rests on the state, the challenge is to 
determine what resources are available for social security purposes in different sub-
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Saharan African societies at particular points in time and what social security measures 
are affordable within those resource constraints. 
What is social security? 
The conventional ILO definition of social security (ILO 1984:3) is deficient in two 
respects. First, it places undue emphasis on the role of the state in social security 
provision. Second, it presumes that the majority of the citizens have already reached a 
satisfactory living standard in a modern economy, which social security is designed to 
protect. The referent is obviously Western societies which hardly fits the contemporary 
African situation.  
 
With reference to developing countries, three functions of social security in a broad 
sense are often considered: amelioration, prevention, and development. First, the 
ameliorating function is evident in social assistance with a view to relieving acute 
stress, although it sometimes approaches semi-permanency. Social assistance is 
generally subject to means-testing. Second, the preventive function of social security is 
exemplified by social insurance and employer liability programmes, designed to 
maintain income when regular earnings are interrupted or terminated due to various 
contingencies. Third, at a higher level of social security a developmental function 
materialises through the use of social security resources for both economic and human 
capital mobilisation, e.g. the deployment of provident or social insurance fund 
resources for investment purposes (Midgley 1993:136). 
 
In criticising the ILO definition, several authors have argued for a wider conception 
and see the objective of social security as the prevention, by social means, of very low 
standards of living, irrespective of whether these result from chronic deprivation or 
temporary adversity (Burgess and Stern 1991:43; Leliveld 1991; Guhan 1994:48). 
However, such comprehensive definitions are so wide that social security would then 
encompass virtually all sorts of programme designed to alleviate or reduce chronic 
poverty. To exclude the temporary nature of distress from the definition of social 
security, ostensibly to make it more applicable to the situation of developing societies 
where chronic distress prevails, i.e. poverty, would render it meaningless. It would 
serve both analytical and policy-making purposes better to keep social security 
arrangements and poverty-reducing measures separate at the conceptual level, rather 
than lumping them together in an unwieldy blanket definition. Social security must 
address contingencies, not permanent conditions. 
 
Acknowledging the need for a broad and flexible definition suitable for developing 
countries – without extending it to comprise poverty-reduction as well – an 
appropriate definition which embraces all forms of social security in varying 
configurations of traditional, informal and formalised modern forms would be the 
following (Schmidt 1995:11–12): 
 
… the sum of all regulations within a society which aim to guarantee the individual or the 
group not only physical survival, but also general protection against unforeseeable risks 
which would entail the deterioration of their situation, and the consequences of which 
cannot be borne by the individual or group without external assistance. 
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Following the independence of African countries in the early 1960s, it was expected – 
up until the late 1970s – that their economies would expand and continue to provide 
formal employment for a growing proportion of the population. Instead, the 1980s 
saw economic contraction and structural adjustment. The youthful age structure of the 
populations produced an explosion of school-leavers seeking work. And the rural 
exodus continued unabatedly. As a result, large numbers of labour market entrants 
sought refuge in the informal economy, predominantly in towns and cities. Recovery is 
still elusive for most African economies. These developments have left three-fourths of 
the labour force outside the formal economy, either in subsistence agriculture or in 
low-income informal activities such as small-scale manufacturing, domestic service or 
petty trading (Gillion et al. 2000:518). Since most social security arrangements cater 
only for the formal economy this means that, in terms of coverage, the overwhelming 
majority of Africans remains unprotected by formal means against the main risks. 
 
In these circumstances, from what sources do Africans actually derive social security? It 
should be inserted here that large segments of the African populations do not enjoy 
social security at all; they are at the mercy of nature and human forces beyond their 
control. Traditionally, however, the collective solidarity of the extended family, clan 
and ethnic group was the mainstay of income and social security for the majority of 
Africans (Kayongo-Male and Onyango 1984:80–82; Kaseke 1997:42). In archaic 
agricultural societies stockpiling of goods, in particular foodstuffs, was the only buffer 
or ‘insurance’ against seasonal risks of crop failure, or other natural calamities. With 
increasing differentiation and more complex redistribution systems, more sophisticated 
forms of traditional social security came into existence. The various cropping, leasing 
and farming systems of a community form the material foundation on which 
compensatory mechanisms are build, based on custom, culture and religion (Platteau 
1991). These collective, community-based social security arrangements are based on 
systems of mutual dependence or reciprocity, although of variable strength (Sahlins 
1972). But this stylised representation of traditional society is largely gone or is fast 
disappearing. Family ties are eroding and the pressures on family cohesion are 
tremendous and increasing, owing particularly to the devastating consequences of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in many African countries. 
 
Under colonial rule and after independence most African countries saw the 
establishment of social security institutions, initially catering for the expatriates. 
Gradually, they were extended to Africans so as to supplement the traditional forms. 
To a limited extent private insurance companies have also entered the field. 
Furthermore, various informal arrangements have co-existed with those of the state 
and the private sector. Today, four broad types of institution provide social security in 
the African context: the state; the private market; civil society; and the family. From an 
institutional perspective the principal difference between these sources of social security 
is found in their underlying incentive structure of co-operation and compliance. The 
state relies on legislation and compulsion, whereas the market depends on economic 
incentives. By contrast, civil society social security arrangements are predicated on 
mutual interest and peer pressure, while the family provides cohesion based on deep-
seated social norms and values (Jütting 2000:7). 
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Different social security institutions 
Social security provision in developing countries has evolved by default rather than by 
design. Since developing countries still find themselves in a transitional phase, however 
protracted, traditional forms of social security co-exist with modern ones, 
supplemented by ‘in-between’ variants of an informal nature. 
State-based systems 
State-based social security systems are modelled on European experiences and cater for 
people in the modern sector of the economy, i.e. only for those in organised public and 
private employment. For example, social insurance pension schemes and provident 
funds typically cover only 5–10 per cent of the total labour force plus their dependants 
(Gillion et al. 2000:520). 
 
With regard to the design of state-based social security schemes a distinction is 
normally made between social assistance and social insurance (Iyer 1993:189–192). 
The former is defined as benefits in cash or in kind financed by the state (at central or 
local level), as a rule provided on the basis of means-testing. Typical examples are so-
called safety nets for poor people in need. The concept also includes universal benefit 
schemes which are not means-tested, e.g. child and family support. Social assistance is 
non-contributory, i.e. the beneficiaries do not contribute in advance of drawing 
benefits. It is funded from general tax revenue. 
 
By contrast, social insurance as a form of social security is financed by contributions 
and is based on the insurance principle. In this context, insurance is understood to 
mean the elimination of uncertainty associated with loss for the individual or the 
household. This is achieved by pooling the contributions of a large number of similarly 
risk-exposed individuals or households into a common fund that compensates the loss 
experienced by any member. In other words, resource-pooling and risk-sharing are 
defining characteristics of social insurance schemes which by nature are collective. As 
such they contain an element of redistribution. But they may be administered either 
publicly by the state or privately by insurance companies. Social insurance schemes 
may be compulsory or voluntary. 
 
Another important distinction is drawn between defined-benefit and defined-
contribution schemes. The former means that the benefits accruing to the beneficiaries 
are defined when the scheme is designed, which ensures the predictability of benefits. In 
the case of pension schemes the formulae used may be simple such as a flat rate per 
year of service or more complex such as a percentage of the average wage during a 
specified period of service (Barbone and Sanchez 2000:48–49). With regard to health 
plans the benefits are usually defined in terms of the treatment offered, including 
hospitalisation, and monetary ceilings or maximum duration of hospitalisation. 
Defined-benefit schemes can be public or private, compulsory or voluntary, 
contributory or non-contributory. In the case of public schemes, the benefits are often 
guaranteed by the state, in which case there is little incentive to improve performance. 
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On the other hand, in defined-contribution schemes – typically pension schemes – the 
benefits received depend on the contributions made previously. In principle, defined-
contribution systems are fully funded: the assets equal the liabilities (Barbone and 
Sanchez 2000:49). Provident funds are typical examples of such arrangements. The 
members pay individual contributions during their working life on the pay-as-you-go 
principle. Upon retirement they receive the accumulated contributions in a lump-sum 
payment plus accrued interest, less administrative costs. Alternatively, annuities may be 
set up. Individual accounts are kept for each member. A major weakness of such 
schemes is the effects of inflation and currency devaluation, which tends to erode the 
real value of the pension benefits received. With good financial management, however, 
the yield on the investment of fund reserves might compensate for the inflation loss. 
With defined-contribution systems, the beneficiaries have a strong incentive in 
improved management and would have sought to ensure that it happened if proper 
mechanisms were in place. Most often they are not, though. 
 
Few countries in sub-Saharan Africa have defined-benefit pension schemes so far. But it 
is politically very tempting to convert provident funds to defined-benefit systems, partly 
due to the poor performance of the former and partly because the lump-sum payments 
to the beneficiaries are grossly inadequate. The short-term political and economic 
attraction of this conversion lies in the ability of the government to improve its outlays 
to beneficiaries without increasing its contributions. It may even be possible to increase 
the range of benefits. This apparent ‘miracle’ is possible because the scheme thus moves 
from a fully funded to an unfunded system. The long-term consequences will not have 
to be faced until well into the future. If the fund is well managed and the returns on 
investments are competitive, the conversion may be sustainable for a considerable 
period of time. However, with a changing age structure of the population and the 
increasing life expectancy of pensioners, pressures will be mounting and eventually the 
reserves will be depleted. At some point contributions will have to be increased or the 
benefits reduced (Barbone and Sanchez 2000:51). Sustained economic growth and a 
broadening of the contributions base would, of course, postpone that eventuality, and 
politicians seem to bank on that. 
 
Tanzania converted in 1998 its erstwhile National Provident Fund to a fully-fledged 
National Social Security Fund to be implemented in phases (Bandawe 2000). In the 
first phase, the new scheme provides a qualified member with at least 15 years’ 
membership comparatively generous pension benefits from the age of 60, including 
monthly payments (Ejuba 2000:19). 
 
Four other African countries have done the same: the Seychelles (late 1970s), Ghana 
(1991), Nigeria (1994), and Zambia (1997). Kenya, Swaziland and Uganda plan to 
follow suit. Gambia administers both a social insurance pension scheme and a 
provident fund. Mauritius and the Seychelles operate both universal as well as 
employment-related benefit programmes. Botswana introduced a means-tested social 
programme in 1980 (Bar-On 2001) and provides a social pension scheme. South Africa 
and Namibia also give social pensions to sizable population groups (Devereux 2001). 
Most francophone African countries adopted from the outset the social insurance 
method as opposed to the provident fund approach. 
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Of the types of social security benefits that the ILO and the International Social 
Security Association prioritise, two take precedence in sub-Saharan Africa: old-age and 
survivor benefits; sickness and injury benefits. Given the state of African economies 
and the very high rate of unemployment, it would definitely not be feasible to 
introduce a tax-funded unemployment benefit scheme. International organisations have 
advised against it (Kaseke 1988:17). For much the same economic reasons, maternity 
benefits, child and family allowances have been left out; fertility rates are too high. The 
exception is social assistance for those close to destitution, which has been politically 
inevitable. 
 
One of the main social protection problems in Africa is coverage. The normative and 
political imperatives of extending existing schemes are so strong that it seems 
unavoidable. On the other hand, the economic and fiscal situation is such that the 
prospects are bad in most sub-Saharan African countries for the introduction of tax-
based social assistance schemes either on a universal or means-tested basis. The number 
of poor is simply too large and the tax base too narrow. Contributory health insurance 
schemes suffer from similar problems, mainly because of the unpredictability of 
benefits and the adverse selection problem (Cichon and Gillion 1993). The prospects 
are somewhat better with respect to contributory pension schemes. A convincing case 
can be made for the judicious extension of coverage in order to improve the financial 
base. More contributors mean greater revenue immediately while the payable benefits 
may be deferred into the future. Trust and governance are the main hurdles. 
 
Apart from the question of scope and coverage, existing public social security 
institutions face major problems of governance and management (Bailey 2000). The 
administration of social security systems is complex and many schemes have not been 
managed in the best interest of the contributors and beneficiaries. There are deficiencies 
in record keeping and in the processing of benefit claims (Gillion et al. 2000:522). In 
terms of financial management the greatest challenge is related to compliance. Failure 
by participants to fulfil their payment obligations threatens both the legitimacy and 
financial viability of the schemes. If evasion is widespread, governments may be 
compelled to cover the shortfall (McGillivray 2000:77).  
 
For employees social security contributions are, as a rule, withheld from their wages by 
their employers who, in turn, are legally required to remit the contributions, along with 
their own, to the appropriate collection authority. Normally, this check-off system 
works well but sometimes employers fail to make the remittances within the specified 
time limits. An employee’s evasion presupposes collusion with the employer, but more 
often the employers collude with the compliance officers of the collection authority. If 
schemes comprise self-employed and young, domestic, casual or part-time workers, the 
scope for evasion is even greater. Evasion is prevalent among employers in small-scale 
enterprises, in the informal economy and those in financial difficulties. Typical evasion 
techniques include failure to register eligible workers, under-reporting of earnings, and 
delay or failure to remit contributions (McGillivray 2000:78–82). 
Market-based systems 
In the 1980s structural adjustment programmes emphasised liberalisation, deregulation 
and a reduced role for the state. These developments provided new opportunities for 
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the private sector. Hence, complementary market-based social security schemes run by 
private insurance companies on a commercial basis were introduced alongside the 
state-based systems.  
 
Although market-based systems are on the ascendancy they still play a marginal role in 
the total provision of social security. This is a reflection of the state of African 
economies and the low income level of the majority of the population. While the 
efficiency and quality of commercial social insurance systems are recognised, their 
inaccessibility for the low-income strata renders them suitable instruments mainly for 
the affluent, urban-based parts of the population. 
 
Pressures to privatise social security have not really taken hold in Africa. Statist 
traditions are resilient and social security is considered such an essential service that the 
state prefers to retain it under its umbrella. Even so, since the investment performance 
of public social security funds has been so abysmal – in effect, funds have been 
appropriated by governments – a case can be built for privatising the particular 
investment function, if not the entire administration and management (McGillivray 
1998:23). 
Membership-based systems in civil society 
Owing to the limited coverage of state-based and market-based social security systems 
an array of membership -based schemes have emerged in civil society. They fill a gap 
left by the state and the market. The distinguishing criteria of these schemes are their 
internal homogeneity and limited size. Those who form such groups have something in 
common that bind them together in mutual interest: kinship or ethnicity; geographical 
origin, or friendship (Lourenco-Lindell 2001). And they are small enough to be 
manageable. These mutual-help societies take a multitude of forms. All over Africa, the 
best known are perhaps the informal rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs). The basic principle is the same everywhere: a fixed sum is paid periodically 
into a common pool by each member. From this pool each member may withdraw at 
fixed intervals a lump sum equal to his/her own contribution multiplied by the number 
of members. Thus, each member has rotating access to a continuously replenished pool 
of capital (Geertz 1962:243). The pool may run for a short while, only a few months, 
or extend over several years; it may involve small sums of money or considerable 
amounts; the members may be few or many; it may comprise a mixture of members, 
only women, only men, urban dwellers or rural peasants. The variants are legion but 
the basic principle remains the same. 
 
Most ROSCAs are perhaps not primarily social security institutions. As a rule, the 
withdrawn money may be used for any purpose. Some members use it for investment, 
others for pure consumption items, and still others to withstand hardship in social 
security contingencies (illness, accident, death, unemployment, etc.). As such they 
constitute an important informal social security mechanism, which enables poor people 
to deal with contingencies. 
 
A second, slightly more formalised type of social security arrangement is organised 
along co-operative lines. Savings and credit co-operatives (SACCOs) are often linked to 
the workplace. Small deductions are made regularly from the wage, and after a 
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stipulated period the contributor is allowed to withdraw, say, three times his/her 
contribution. Repayment is also through a wage deduction. Again, there is generally no 
restriction on the use of the loan and many borrowers use the money to meet 
contingencies. 
 
At present, social security arrangements hardly exist for the great majority of self-
employed peasants in the rural areas. There is some scope, however, for crop-based 
schemes. To finance basic social protection levies could be imposed on cash crops 
delivered to co-operatives or other marketing organisations. The design of such 
schemes could be negotiated by the peasants in conjunction with the officers of their 
organisations, probably with technical assistance inputs from outside. 
 
More or less formalised NGOs also perform social security functions but they appear 
to be less important than ROSCAs and SACCOs. Be that as it may, there seems to be 
scope for strengthening the role of NGOs in social security provision. Trade unions are 
particularly well placed in that regard, but their disadvantage from the point of view of 
coverage is that they are confined to the formal sector of the economy.  
 
All the above civil society forms of social security have an untapped potential, and with 
concerted efforts their relative importance could grow. Some would argue that the state 
should leave them alone lest they become ‘contaminated’ and acquire the same 
problems that have beset the state schemes. On the other hand, judicious, unobtrusive 
technical assistance might be in order to improve management and enhance efficiency. 
Kinship-based systems 
The support system of the extended family is still alive in Africa, albeit under severe 
pressure. First, the productive resources an average household commands are 
diminishing, mainly due to the sub-division of land from one generation to another. 
Second, household expenditures are soaring with the introduction of cost sharing in 
education, health and other services due to high inflation rates. Third, the dependency 
ratio is increasing due to unemployment, persistently high fertility rates, children 
orphaned by AIDS, and the destitution of relatives. All this constrains the ability of the 
households to contribute to informal social security networks, simply because there is 
little to spare. Instead, indebtedness results for an increasing number of households. 
The ratio of households forming the backbone of the informal social security system to 
those in need of support, is falling. 
Demographic impacts 
All social security systems are sensitive to demographic changes (Lambo 2000). Some 
parameters are particularly important: fertility, mortality and population growth rates, 
as well as age structure. To varying degrees the HIV/AIDS pandemic has a bearing on 
them all. 
 
After independence natural population growth rose in sub-Saharan Africa and peaked 
at about 2.8 per cent in the early 1990s. The estimated overall annual growth rate had 
declined to about 2.7 per cent by 1997, largely stemming from declining fertility rates 
in countries that undoubtedly have entered a demographic transition period. The UN 
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has projected that the average fertility rate will fall from 6.0 in 1995 to 4.6 in 2010 
and further to 3.7 in 2020. 
 
Notwithstanding falling fertility trends, population growth rates will still be 
maintained at a high level by the momentum built into the age structure. The African 
population is comparatively young. In most countries about half are below the age of 
15. In the decades ahead these young cohorts will enter their reproductive age and 
produce babies.  
 
The proportion of elderly above 60 years of age is low, on average 5.3 per cent in 
1998, compared to nearly 20 per cent in Europe. Although this may seem reassuring in 
terms of pressure on pensions and some other social security schemes, the picture is 
deceptive. Declining fertility rates combined with declining mortality rates and the 
resultant rise in life expectancy have contributed to the ageing of the population. What 
is more, the greying of the population has increased, i.e. those who have reached 
retirement age live longer than before.   
 
The consequences of the HIV/AIDS pandemic have interfered with the ‘normal’ 
demographic trajectories. Above all, mortality rates have risen sharply in those 
countries in Eastern and Southern Africa where the infection rate is highest, with 15–
20 per cent of the adult population. The rising mortality rates have had dramatic effect 
on life expectancy. In the 29 hardest hit African countries life expectancy at birth is 
currently estimated at 47 years – seven years less than what might have been the case in 
the absence of AIDS. Projections suggest that by 2010–2015 life expectancy is likely to 
be 16 years shorter than without AIDS (Lambo 2000:134). Although life expectancy at 
birth is plummeting, the longevity of pensioners, however, will not decline. 
 
These devastating consequences will not only influence long-term population growth 
prospects. Cynics of the Malthusian persuasion might say that AIDS is ‘solving’ 
Africa’s population growth problem. In the context of social security, however, the 
consequences of AIDS impact on dependency ratios because the size of the labour force 
will decline. The population dependency ratio measured by 60-years-olds and older to 
total population will increase, as will the ratio of 60-year-olds and older to the 
population between 15 and 59. 
 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic puts severe strain on all social security arrangements, 
regardless of design. The resources consumed at all levels of society to deal with this 
scourge undermine the ability to finance long-term investment in social security 
measures. It is an irony that the very phenomenon of HIV/AIDS, while undermining 
the evolution of better social security systems, also reinforces the need for reform and 
improvement.  
Feasibility considerations 
In view of the above, the prospects for feasible social security systems in sub-Saharan 
Africa do not appear encouraging. In the circumstances, the only practicable way 
forward is to combine the four main tiers of social security, and devise a new division 
of responsibility between public and private provision. At any rate, whatever new 
‘blends’ emerge must be closely tailored to the needs and conditions of each country. 
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Judicious expansion of state- and market-based schemes is no doubt feasible, with 
emphasis on contributory arrangements. The problems of collection, administration, 
investment and general governance are tough but not insurmountable. The real 
challenge, however, lies in expanding the membership-based arrangements of civil 
society, including crop-based schemes to capture the vast majority of smallholders who 
generally fall outside existing systems. State and foreign technical support can probably 
play a significant role in establishing unconventional schemes outside the formal 
structures. 
 
In the long run the feasibility of sub-Saharan social security systems will depend on 
sustained economic growth to create jobs and opportunities so as to improve the basis 
for both tax-based social assistance and contributory social insurance.  
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Summary 
The international community is devoting increasing 
attention to social security issues in developing countries 
as part of its preoccupation with poverty reduction. This 
paper discusses social security arrangements in place in 
sub-Saharan African countries to mitigate the 
contingencies of their citizens, with emphasis on the 
masses of poor people, including the ways in which the 
poor themselves try to tackle unexpected adversity. The 
basic argument is that for a social security system to be 
feasible in the current circumstances of widespread 
economic crisis, formal and informal mechanisms will 
have to be combined. 
While recognising the normative foundation of 
social security in the international human rights regime 
and taking its point of departure in the vulnerability of 
poor households the paper looks at various definitions of 
social security. It proceeds with an enumeration of formal 
state-based and market-based systems, as well as informal 
membership-based systems in civil society and traditional 
kinship-based systems. Taking into account the 
demographic impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic the 
paper concludes that the feasibility of social security 
arrangements in the present economic circumstances of 
sub-Saharan Africa hinges on the combination of formal 
and informal sub-systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0804-3639 
ISBN 82-8062-084-2 
 
  
 
 
Recent Working Papers 
 
 
 
 
WP 2004: 4  TOSTENSEN, Arne 
Rural-urban linkages in sub-Saharan Africa: Contemporary debates and 
implications for Kenyan urban workers in the 21st century. Bergen, 2004, 13 pp. 
WP 2004: 3 KOLSTAD, Ivar 
What constitutes a convention? Implications for the coexistence of conventions. Bergen, 2004, 
25 pp. 
WP 2004: 2 KOLSTAD, Ivar and Espen Villanger 
 Determinants of foreign direct investment in services. Bergen, 2004, 25 pp. 
WP 2004: 1 KNUDSEN, Are 
 License to kill. Honour killings in Pakistan. Bergen, 2004. 
WP 2003: 13 RAKNER, Lise 
 Uncertainty as a strategy: Electoral processes in Zambia 1991-2001. Bergen, 2003, 21 pp. 
WP 2003:12 FJELDSTAD, Odd-Helge 
 What has trust got to do with it? Non-payment of service charges in local authorities in South 
Africa. Bergen, 2003, 26 pp. 
WP 2003:11 BJORVATN, Kjetil and Carsten Eckel 
 Winners and losers from an international investment agreement. Bergen, 2003, 20 pp. 
WP 2003:10 KNUDSEN, Are 
 Islamism in the diaspora : Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Bergen, 2003, 23 pp. 
WP 2003: 9 GLOPPEN, Siri, Lise Rakner and Arne Tostensen 
 Responsiveness to the concerns of the poor and accountability to the commitment to poverty 
reduction. Bergen, 2003, 25 pp. 
WP 2003: 8 WIIG, Arne and Ivar Kolstad 
 Lowering barriers to agricultural exports through technical assistance. Bergen, 2003, 15 pp. 
WP 2003: 7 SØREIDE, Tina and Kjetil Bjorvatn 
 Corruption and market reform. Bergen, 2003, 23 pp. 
WP 2003: 6 VILLANGER, Espen 
 The effects of disasters on income mobility: Bootstrap inference and measurement error 
simulations. Bergen, 2003, 27 pp. 
WP 2003: 5 VILLANGER, Espen 
 Company interests and foreign aid policy: Playing donors out against each other. Bergen, 2003, 
40 pp. 
WP 2003: 4 VILLANGER, Espen 
 Company influence on foreign aid disbursement: Is conditionality credible when donors have 
mixed motives? Bergen, 2003, 36 pp. 
WP 2003: 3  VILLANGER, Espen 
   Verdensbankens strukturtilpasningsprogrammer: Virkninger og politiske  
   linjeskift. Bergen, 2003, 19 pp. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CMI’s publications, Annual Report and quarterly newsletters are available on CMI’s homepage 
www.cmi.no. 
 
 
